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Abstract Current governance structures are increasingly show-
ing inability to address complex issues such as the Grand
Challenges. Dealing with these highly interrelated, cross cutting,
extensive and potentially open ended issues requires research,
development and innovation to be oriented towards societal
needs and demands. Here, developing and applying sustainable
long term strategies for socio-technical change on the basis of
socially robust knowledge seems inevitable and using the tools of
anticipatory governance—forward looking and participation—is
essential in order to govern innovation actively and responsibly.
Yet, expert-based forward looking has its limits, especially when
considering long term perspectives, and may fail to include all
necessary opinions. Thus, stakeholder engagement has become a
norm over the last decades, but including laypeople into forward
looking science, technology and innovation (STI) governance is
underexplored. Here, strategy and policy programme develop-
ment may be well suited to function as early entry point for
public needs and values into the innovation process. This paper
will briefly review the theoretical basis for transdisciplinary for-
ward looking and provide first insights into an ongoing highly
deliberative and reflexive foresight and co-creation process en-
gaging science, society and policy makers, CIMULACT—
Citizen and Multi-Actor Consultation on Horizon2020. We will
especially focus on the role of technology within a collective
visioning exercise that allowed for shared explorations of desir-
able futures, thereby collecting tacit knowledge as well as social
needs and values. Integrating these with stakeholders’ and ex-
perts’ knowledge serves for co-creating socially robust
knowledge for orienting policy and strategy programming to-
wards needs based science, technology and innovation.
Keywords Transdisciplinarity . Participatory foresight .
Co-creation . Visioning . Programme development . Research
and innovation governance
Towards needs based STI
Current governance structures are increasingly showing in-
ability to address complex issues such as the Grand
Challenges with the needed speed or resolve [1]. The Grand
Societal Challenges build the basis of the actual Framework
programme of the EU (Horizon 2020). They address issues
such as climate change, the ageing society or food security,
which are highly interrelated, cross cutting, extensive and po-
tentially open-ended issues. Dealing with them requires re-
search, development and innovation to be oriented towards
needs, demands and expectations of society. Unwanted side
effects of socio-technical change can thus be minimized in
advance and do not need to be regulated costly afterwards.
Here, developing and applying sustainable long term strate-
gies for socio-technical change seems inevitable for nourish-
ing prosperous societies.
Using the tools of anticipatory governance—forward
looking and participation—is essential in order to govern in-
novation actively and responsibly. Key principles of respon-
sible research and innovation (RRI) recently given high prom-
inence on EU and national level are therefore ‘anticipation,
reflection and deliberation in and around research and inno-
vation, influencing the direction of these and associated poli-
cy’ [2]. This entails mutual responsiveness between society
and innovators, leading to higher acceptability, sustainability
and desirability of innovation processes and products [3]. As a
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concept, RRI builds on ‘technology assessment and foresight,
application of the precautionary principle, normative/ethical
principles to design technology, innovation governance and
stakeholder involvement and public engagement’ [4].
Gaining an understanding of futures is essential to RRI, and
forward looking activities are therefore an integral part of the
concept [5]. Therefore Foresight has been integrated in RRI
toolkits [6, 7].
To increase flexibility, a more systematic embedding of
Future-oriented Technology Analysis (FTA)—combining ap-
proaches of Foresight, Technology Assessment (TA) and fore-
casting—into science, technology and innovation governance
is repeatedly called for [1, 8–11]. In Europe, Foresight and TA
have increasingly contributed to political priority setting and
strategic decision making over the last 30 years [12, 13], and
recently a shift from narrow technology focussed approaches
to broader perspectives of the entire socio-technical systems is
recognized [14]. Innovation understood as complex process,
often entails profound uncertainties and high risks, demanding
large investments with late return, or stranded investments
[15, 16]. Within this setting, expectations are a main driver
in shaping new technologies, often producing various forms
of hype cycles along the way to market readiness or failure
[17–19]. Here, Futures Studies support harnessing and
orienting these expectations.
In shaping socio-technical change through informing STI
policy, forward-looking activities can fulfil several functions:
eliciting shared goals and visions among a group of partici-
pating actors from different sectors, creating and fostering
new networks and structures, combining relevant information
on current trends and future developments, as well as address-
ing system deficiencies and failures [12, 13]. For instance, the
collaborative development of cross-cutting challenges for
European policy making that demand coordinated policy ac-
tions was supported by forward-looking activities [20, 21].
Especially when dealing with the Grand Challenges, Futures
Studies need to attend to the distinctive role of challenging
predictions that are mainly based on extrapolated past events
by emphasizing on creativity to present true alternatives [9].
Nevertheless, producing such socio-technical imaginaries
may only shape futures appropriated to those engaged in the
visioning process [22], whereas other—at times socially more
robust—futures may become ever more inaccessible. This im-
plies broad engagement strategies, moving away from reduc-
tionist experts-only-settings when creating such imaginaries.
This paper will briefly review the theoretical basis for trans-
disciplinary forward looking and provide insights into the
tools of a highly deliberative and reflexive Foresight and co-
creation process engaging science, society and policy makers:
CIMULACT—Citizen and Multi-Actor Consultation on
Horizon2020 [23]. Intermediate results include excerpts from
Europe-wide citizens’ visions and extracted social needs.
Here, wewill especially focus on the role of technologywithin
this content. On this basis, we will elicit implications for
governing sustainable human centred technologies. For the
theoretical underpinnings of this paper, we mainly draw on
literature from the established interdisciplines of Futures
Studies, Technology Assessment, and sustainability science
as well as science and technology studies (STS).
Limits of expert-based forward looking
When scientists act as experts, Nowotny [24] argues, they
need to answer to questions they did not chose and therefore
transgress the limits of their competence, by addressing issues
that cannot be reduced to the purely scientific or technical, and
by addressing a mixed audience, not only composed of fel-
low-experts. This is especially disadvantageous, when deci-
sion makers elicit expertise in times of high uncertainty when
neither sufficient knowledge nor all necessary information is
available, and thus expertise becomes vulnerable to contesta-
tion [24]. Additionally, many policy makers maintain relation-
ships with so called ‘pet’ experts – experts that are consistently
commissioned to provide a convenient and predictable opin-
ion on certain topics, which can then be utilized in political
arguments [25]. As a result, decision makers’ and public con-
fidence in expertise may diminish, if an issue is repeatedly
contested by opposing experts’ opinions that may be elicited
almost at any time, due to prevailing uncertainty [26, 27].
This line of argumentation may especially hold true for
policy and strategy advice produced by Futures Studies, a
field where high uncertainty and thus many—possibly op-
posed or conflictive—options are often inherent to a single
study, not mention several ones. On this matter, Grunwald
[28] states that results of Futures Studies are prone to contes-
tation as they are often controversial, divergent or even con-
tradictory. Unsurprisingly, increasing time horizons signifi-
cantly decrease the accuracy of technological forecasts [29];
and beyond short term prediction, expert anticipation of pos-
sible or probable futures become highly arbitrary [30, 31].
Future-oriented technology analysis also repeatedly fails to
anticipate technological innovations with important social
and economic effects [32]. Considering the disruptive poten-
tial of emerging technologies, Nordmann [33] even provokes
by claiming that anticipating future effects of STI is impossi-
ble because anticipation only allows for anticipating changes
‘in a world as we know it’, not a changed one.
Against this backdrop, there is a distinct need for future
studies to produce policy advice on the basis of socially robust
knowledge. Such robustness is achieved through (a) testing
for validity in the real world, (b) social distribution of exper-
tise and the links built with other types of knowledge and
experience, and (c) constant testing, expanding and modifica-
tion [24, 34]. Endorsing public values in the innovation pro-
cess is in need of interdisciplinary research to avoid contested
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technologies [35, 36]. Transdisciplinary knowledge co-pro-
duction, however, is recognized as effective in addressing
and current sustainability challenges [37]. Here, transdisci-
plinary Foresight and co-creation may offer an additional val-
ue added.
From participatory to transdisciplinary foresight
Even though, forward looking activities have been and still are
largely an experts’ game, including a greater variety of actors
and perspectives is a demand that practitioners and scholars
have been articulating for decades [38, 39]. Participatory
methods for Futures Studies have been discussed since the
1960’s and over the last two decades practitioners developed
and applied numerous participatory methods [40]. Here, stake-
holder engagement has become a norm, but moving from in-
terdisciplinary settings and stakeholders towards also including
laypeople into forward looking activities can be increasingly
observed [41–46]. Collective utopian thinking is seen as a tool
for strategic long term thinking and transdisciplinary problem
solving [47, 48]. Being especially equipped for dealing with
complex wicked problems—highly interrelated, cross cutting
extensive and potentially open ended issues—such as the
Grand Challenges, post normal solution oriented knowledge
co-creation requires constructive inputs of various types of
knowledge, including norms and values [49, 50]. Some authors
see this as means for shifting leadership from an individual
activity to a co-creative act [51]. Several reasons for public
participation are established in literature; producing better de-
cisions and raising legitimacy among the most relevant ones
[52–55]. On EU-level, shaping citizenry and strengthening
trust in EU institutions may be added [56, 57]. In correspon-
dence to the established functions of participation practices,
Wiek and Iwaniec [58] describe several process-level functions
of collective visioning activities: building capacity,
empowering stakeholders, creating ownership, and developing
accountability. Despite increasingly becoming established,
transdisciplinarity is far from being a standard tool for
supporting decision making and several barriers remain in
place, such as failing or absent mechanisms for translating out-
comes of deliberative processes into policy making, decision
makers’ failing interest in or diffuse understanding of the use of
such results, as well as slow and partial implementation of the
participatory norm as laid out in EU constitutional treaties, that
entails large room for interpretation [59–61].
The existing Futures Studies literature is somewhat sparse
in assessing laypeople engagement. Popp [39] even calls for
distinctive quality criteria for participatory Futures Studies as
well as ‘the essential involvement of participation-oriented
researchers in the critical discourse of the scientific communi-
ty’. In sustainability science for instance, a large body of lit-
erature on transdisciplinary, community-based, interactive,
and participatory research approaches is available [62, 63].
Within other disciplines, for instance STS and TA, public
engagement (PE) with science and technology is a well inves-
tigated topic.
Limits to public engagement
Public engagement’s faces are manifold, and it differs accord-
ing to many variables including but not limited to the context
it is applied in, scope, topic, sector, who is engaged when,
what is their role and what is the aimed for outcome. Thus
PE is not restricted to certain areas, but it is necessary in all
areas where potentially societal effects may be expected.
Nevertheless, pre-aligning all areas of R&D with public ben-
efit may be superfluous or even counterproductive.
Innovation, for example, is frequently a by-product of basic
research and thus there is a distinct need for basic research to
remain independent and free as it is very often not possible to
discern a public value ex-ante. Some scientific knowledge
may also not seem relevant for societal problem solving at
the time it is produced, but may become relevant later if cir-
cumstances change or it is interlinked with other findings.
Such research would encounter difficulties to prove public
value in early stages of research and would therefore hardly
be funded under a strict PE regime. Additionally, there is the
argument that the questions of how, who and when to engage
is only a timely one, as when a new product is introduced, the
market decides. Yet, adhering to needs based innovation may
help to avoid stranded investments.
At least since the so called participatory turn in the 1990’s,
PE in STI issues became widely accepted [64], and several
successful case-studies, theoretical arguments and practical
guidelines are reported [e.g. 65–69]. At the same time, a dis-
course about the necessity of PE in decision making processes
emerged on EU-level, cumulating in constitutional norm in
the Lisbon treaty [59]. Yet, democratization in the EU is
counteracted by a strong trend towards elitism [70]. Despite
widespread PE enthusiasm, scholarly and political debate de-
veloped various critical and hypercritical arguments. Themost
commonly identified shortcomings include that PE fails to
deliver the aimed for results, such as gains in rationality, stim-
ulating debate or actual impact on strategy and policy-making
[41, 54, 57, 59, 60, 71–80]. Here, discrepancies particularly
emerge, when bridging the gap between theory and practice
[81, 82]. Part of the problem is that participatory practices are
often constructed as political alternatives, as ‘they normally
are not part of the institutions of parliamentary politics’ [83].
Yet, legally required PE, for instance applied as a communi-
cation or conflict management tools may not show the neces-
sary flexibility with respect to the timing of engagement. For
instance, if a technology is already consolidated, PE aimed at
shaping and controlling it may often be too late. Thus, a
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prevailing scholarly demand for the early involvement of mul-
tiple actors including the public in the innovation process is
currently expressed in concepts such as RRI or upstream en-
gagement [2, 84–87]. Nevertheless, such early engagement
faces the challenge that effects of a respective technology
cannot be assessed reliably before implementation [88].
Here, transdisciplinary Foresight, as a setting for early up-
stream engagement in strategy and policy programme devel-
opment, offers resolve.
Strategy and policy programme development
as early entry point for public needs and values
A vast array of methods for engaging multiple actors in the
development of STI programmes such as Horizon2020 is
available [89]. Participatory FTA approaches have shown
their ability to effectively support priority setting in interna-
tional research programme cooperation [90, 91]. Here, trans-
disciplinary Foresight and Co-creation offer a unique ap-
proach to shaping STI agendas. Collective utopian thought
enables laypeople to look for the blue—imagining alternative
ways of e.g. organizing livelihoods, relationships or develop-
ment [92]. Such visioning exercises support moving the dis-
cussions’ focus from immediate concerns towards shared ex-
plorations of a more sustainable future [42]. Analysing such
collective visions allows for collecting tacit knowledge as well
as social needs and values without being restricted to a spe-
cific technology or current feasibility issues [43]. Then, inte-
grating the elicited knowledge and needs with stakeholders’
and experts’ knowledge serves for co-creating socially robust
knowledge for orienting policy and strategy programming to
strengthen responsible innovation. Such an FTA approach
necessarily implies knowledge management, as it engages
multiple actors, sectors and interests in ‘finding, deploying,
using and fusing—and, yes, even creating—knowledge’
[93]. Designing ways to manage the challenges of such par-
ticipatory knowledge co-creation is especially important.
A citizen and multi-actor approach for co-creating
responsible research agendas
The applied method is reflexive and multi-modular, combin-
ing several inter- and transdisciplinary workshops and knowl-
edge management phases in a co-creative Foresight process. It
is based upon the CIVISTI-method—Citizens visions on
Science, Technology and Innovation, which was first devel-
oped and applied in an EU-research project as a demand side
approach producing policy advice for prioritising research
topics in Horizon2020 [43, 60, 94]. The key feature of the
method is a recursive feedback cycle that starts with citizens
producing visions of desirable futures, which are then
analysed for underlying needs and overarching topics. On
basis of visions and the respective analysis, stakeholders and
experts are engaged to create recommendations for STI policy
making, which are than fed back to the citizens for evaluation
and prioritisation. Defined roles for all participating actor
groups are essential within the method; here, the term citizen
is used as synonym for layperson, whereas stakeholders, ex-
perts and policymakers are summarized as multi-actors. An
expert may be understood as a scientific actor with distinct
expertise in the respective field, whereas stakeholders are so-
cietal and economic actors with a specific stake in the field.
After its first application in a pilot study in eight EU coun-
tries, the method was then further developed and adapted to
case specific properties in regional, national and transnational
contexts [95–97]. For instance, one study on autonomous liv-
ing for older adults in future cities was conducted at regional
level for the City of Vienna and entailed process innovations
such as an open online consultation at the end of the project in
order to engage a wider public in the final prioritisation pro-
cess. In a national study aimed at informing the long term
research agenda of the Austrian Agency for Health and Food
safety, the initial vision building workshop was scaled down
from two days to one and additional methods to foster crea-
tivity of participants were introduced. Also a scenario building
phase was added to augment the integration of citizens’ vi-
sions and experts’ recommendations. The CIVISTI-method
was again modified, enriched and readapted to the European
scope within CIMULACT. In short, the project aims at co-
creating socially robust needs based futures for the European
research agenda by engaging citizens and multi-actors and
thereby contributing to RRI and democratic STI governance.
Additionally, the project is a testbed for public participation—
developing, testing, training and assessing methods for citizen
and stakeholder engagement [23].
In a highly deliberative collective visioning process, more
than 1,088 citizens in 30 European countries were engaged
and developed 179 visions of desirable futures [98]. Here,
the method is not aiming at inviting a statistically represen-
tative sample of participants, but building a sample of max-
imum heterogeneity to include a high number of different
perspectives. Thus, each national consultation invited around
36 participants, ensuring a high diversity within the follow-
ing criteria: age, gender, education occupation and place of
living. For example, six age groups were defined, ranging
from 16 to 60 and older; to then have one member of each
age group in all smaller working groups (table level). Four
educational levels—pre-primary to higher education—and
several occupation groups were defined to distribute partic-
ipants at table level aiming at a high heterogeneity of back-
grounds. The criterion of place of living ensured engaging
city as well as country dwellers.
The national vision building workshops followed a
standardised process, starting with several activities to foster
8 Page 4 of 10 Eur J Futures Res (2016) 4: 8
creativity and collect as many ideas as possible, such as
brainstorming, an inspirational picture set or a dream voy-
age. Then, individual work was used as a stepping stone for
deliberations and combined group works with several feed-
back loops. Standardized templates supported the process.
The final output were six visions per country.
As a next step, to elicit implicitly and explicitly men-
tioned social needs within the visions, a workshop with
30 interdisciplinary researchers from the CIMULACT
consortium was held. They were supported by several
challengers from various related fields of work, and joint-
ly identified cross cutting and underlying themes, which
were then shaped into 29 social needs with direct refer-
ences to the citizens visions [99]. This was achieved in a
bottom up analysis following several steps of assessing
the original visions individually and later in smaller work-
ing groups, extracting explicit and implicit topics and
clustering them, always making sure to reference the pro-
duced content to the respective visions.
Based on visions and elaborated social needs 12 clusters of
needs were built to support a large-scale co-creation workshop
in which more than 100 experts, stakeholders and citizens
developed scenarios for the future EU research agenda.
Within this workshop participants were split into small work-
ing groups with around eight participants, representing a va-
riety of perspectives. Experts and stakeholders were assigned
to topics, while citizens chose freely. The scenario building
process followed several steps transferring needs and visions
into scenarios for future research with subsections such as
research direction, research questions, or state of art of current
research on the topic. Overall 48 scenarios were produced.
These research scenarios will be enriched, validated and pri-
oritized in a second round of public face to face as well as
online consultations, engaging again a large variety of actors.
Throughout the process, additional consultations are conduct-
ed with policy makers and program managers at EU level to
ensure the best possible connection of the results of actual
research programs. A pan European conference taking place
in Brussels engaging EU policy makers will shape the re-
search scenarios into the final output, prioritised research
topics in call format, integrating knowledge of lays, experts
and stakeholders. CIMULACT is a European consultation
which draws from national engagement activities in two con-
sultation phases. These national activities were connected to
the European level twice: within the co-creation workshop,
which engaged representatives from all 30 countries and in
the upcoming pan European conference.
Due to the ongoing process and its vast scope of results,
we will focus on results available to date—citizens’ visions
and inherent social needs—and apply our analysis to the
implications for human centred technologies.
The role of technology within citizens’ visions
and corresponding social needs
The pathways of technological transformations are, as
discussed above, at the same heavily dependent on expecta-
tions actors have, as well as the respective innovation ecosys-
tems’ constraints. The digital transformation, for example,
promises greater efficiency, quality improvement of products
and services, an extension of the scope of action, and not least
an increase in quality of life in most areas of daily life: work,
production, mobility, communication, etc. Science, technolo-
gy and innovation (STI) agendas, such as Horizon 2020, cre-
ate the framework conditions that drive such transformations
continuously: ‘The ICT innovation strategy under Horizon
2020 focuses on ensuring that the rapid changes occurring in
ICT technology develop into tangible benefits for European
citizens’ [100]. But what could such tangible benefits actually
look like? What should innovation do for society? How does
STI have to be shaped so that basic values and social needs of
Table 1 Exemplary technologies
mentioned in citizens' visions and
interlinked services
Specific technologies mentioned in visions Service they fulfil
Nuclear fusion, roads equipped with energy captors,
superconductors, green battery
Accessible, affordable, abundant and
green energy
Teleportation, hover platforms, magnetic levitation,
light rail capsule, air vehicle, eco-hovercrafts, drones,
a bridge connecting Cyprus and Crete
Fast, flexible, affordable, smart, reliable
and clean transport
Nano-technology, hibernation, revolutionary drugs,
implanted chips, joint and bones regeneration,
artificial implants
Healthier, prolonged, equal living supported
by technology
Robots Support working and living environments
Memory recovery, e-learning Lifelong learning, strength based education
Holograms Telecommuting, knowledge sharing platforms, Improving interpersonal relationships, equality
Device for reading thoughts Fair dispute resolution
3d printers, a universal material Production autonomy, less consumption
Cyber polling, e-voting, electronic referendum Building trust in democracy, active citizenship
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citizens are taken into account? How can research agendas be
designed in a more democratic way? These are some of the
questions CIMULACT aims at answering.
Here, it is important to clarify the tasks a collective trans-
disciplinary visioning process can fulfil and which it may not.
The citizens’ duty is focussed upon imagining a desirable
future and thereby expressing needs and demands towards
current as well as future developments. If a specific technolo-
gy is mentioned by citizens while visioning, it is not necessar-
ily this technology that plays the visionary part in the desirable
imaginary, but often rather the service it offers and therefore
which need it fulfils. For instance, there is nuclear fusion
Table 2 Examples for
technology as supporter of change Technology as enabler Vision
100 % security of personal data against abuse – it will be achieved by an advanced
technology
CZE3
The robots are not replacing the people, since they are only built to ease the work and
not to take it over
HRV2
The city is self-sufficient because of renewable energy and technology advances ESP6
Technological progress has allowed renewable energies to respond to everyone’s demand FR2
Developments in technology and medical sciences have prolonged people’s lives
and improved
their quality of life
FIN2
More advanced technology which will facilitate communication and relationships
between people.
BGR3
Technological development has evolved and contributed to finding solutions for better
resource management and natural disaster prevention.
POR1
Technology has allowed free time for focusing on personal and collective development POR4
[…]by 2050, the quality of life will have improved tremendously for senior citizens –
aided by technology
ROU4
Technologies at the disposal of education, in order to enable a learning process which is
continuous and not limited to school classes
ITA6
An easier access to advanced technologies, with more intuitive and functional interfaces.
A technology that fosters face-to-face relationships instead of virtual ones, em-powering
actual sociality
ITA6
Profits from patents are used to disseminate education and popularization of science and
technology
SVK1
Digital innovations are used to support learning processes DE5
[…] technological development has contributed to a significant increase of self-treatment/
autonomy, and with this also social equality
NOR3
Technology will develop in harmony with the environment and individuals’ needs ROM3
Technology does not alienate people and does not endanger their health PL3
[..] regulate the role of new technologies in order to avoid damaging the quality of human
relationships
ESP3
Technological developments are making working process easier, but not taking away jobs
from the humans
HRV2
The development of new technologies, in accordance with the laws of nature, will lead to
the improved quality of life
HRV3
The high-tech knowledge we have acquired, is being channelled into new solutions. By
using all resources (people, technology, money), continued welfare and sustainable
growth is created
NOR2
Our level of industrial and technological development allows us to better combine a
shorter working day, time dedicated to child education and a freely chosen contribution
to our community
LUX4
Universal material and technologies allow us to remake old things and turn them into new
ones.[…] This invention frees society from the use of the surplus and creates conditions
for harmonious personalities
LAT4
Living in a society in which technology helps people throughout all aspects of life (food,
health, environment, economic activity) in order to afford the Bluxury^ of investing
in personal development
ROM1
In 2050, the technological and scientific breakthroughs have led to: minimised pollution—
air pollution, water pollution, domestic waste; the use of clean energy sources—growth
of the share of renewable and sustainable energy; clean food and water—self-evident
and available for everybody; environmentally friendly means of transport—public
transport solutions, fuel; a change in the nature of work—a shorter workday,
contribution to socie-ty/social dimension
EST5
8 Page 6 of 10 Eur J Futures Res (2016) 4: 8
mentioned (Austria vision 1), but the context it appears in as
well as connecting it to other visions implies an underlying
need for: ‘accessible, affordable, abundant and green energy’
[101]. Here is an example that shows the focus on a service,
not a technology: ‘Grandpa Paul was saved from a disease that
was incurable 35 years ago, by using nanotechnology. Cancer
is now a common cold’ [Romania vision 6].
Here, it is not the citizens’ duty to identify certain technol-
ogies that can satisfy this need, but expressing the need in the
first place. Another example the same reasoning applies for, is
the demand for ‘fast, flexible, affordable, smart, reliable and
clean transport’ systems (social need 14). At first sight this
may sound like an oxymoron, but again it is citizens setting
a landmark by describing a desirable long term future. By
orienting STI towards this landmark may help fulfilling social
needs, guiding the innovation system in a socially responsible
way, even if the actual technology mentioned in the citizens’
visions—teleportation, hover boards or a bridge connecting
Cyprus and Crete—is never implemented. Another example
is the mentioned hibernation or implanted chips. Here, when
overseeing all visions the cross cutting theme of healthier,
prolonged, equal living which is supported by technology
emerges. Table 1 shows mentioned technologies as well as
the services they are aimed at fulfilling.1
Technology as enabler and supporter not as main focus
of change
Even if we focussed on the role of technology within the
visions and corresponding social needs as a tacit example, it
should be recognized that particular technologies are not the
citizens’ main focus when imagining desirable futures.
Mostly, when science and technology are mentioned—if they
are mentioned at all—they are seen as an entity that in the best
case can facilitate progress and support a better living. The
following Table 2 shows selected excerpts from visions to
provide some examples. Within these examples several addi-
tional demands and expectations towards technology develop-
ment may be found, yet some statements also shed light on
current shortcomings and fears towards technology.
Being forced to develop desirable futures, citizens frame
such fears or shortcomings of current developments positive-
ly, but they are still perceivable as such: ‘Robots are not re-
placing people, since they are only built to ease the work and
not to take it over.’ Or ‘Technology does not alienate people
and does not endanger their health.’
Other examples show a different angle, the mentioned se-
curity against personal data abuse, for instance. Within the
vision an advanced technology is imagined to provide
100 % security. Following current experts’ discourse on the
matter reveals that often user behaviour is seen as one of the
main challenges for providing security. Yet again if laypeople
state ‘science and/or technology should solve the problem’
when depicting desirable futures, this should not necessarily
be narrowed down to actual technologies, but may be seen in
the larger context of innovation. Here, social, technical as well
as organisational innovations may take the role of enabling
solutions for the expressed demands and fears.
Conclusions
Overall, technologies addressed by citizens may sometimes
seem far out and borrowed from sci-fi literature or movies,
as teleportation. Here, such specific technologies should there-
fore in many cases be seen as placeholders for viable solutions
that address fulfilling the indicated needs. Here, social, tech-
nical as well as organisational innovations may take the role of
enabling solutions for the expressed demands and fears. On
the other hand, some technologies mentioned are already
available or very common in experts’ debate, for instance e-
learning. Here, citizens mostly see their potential and wish for
a wide distribution and common equal availability, or simply
adjustments to the current state, such as avoiding personal data
misuse.
We described the merits of including public engagement
into Futures Studies, especially when stakes are high and vast
societal implications can be expected. Dealing with the Grand
Challenges requires socially robust knowledge, therefore in-
cluding a broad basis of actors is advisable, not neglecting
laypeople’s knowledge, experience and opinion. In addition
to stakeholders’ and experts knowledge, socially robust
knowledge can thus be co-created, fromwhich tangible policy
advice for science, technology and innovation governance de-
rives. Here, clear limits of public engagement become obvi-
ous. PE in Futures Studies—transdisciplinary Foresight—
serves well as a starting point to elicit public values and social
needs, but further integration with the established forms of
scientific knowledge as well as stakeholder engagement is
absolutely necessary. Yet, this implies a complex knowledge
management regime, where roles of actors are clearly
delimitated and rules of discussion and knowledge integration
need to be transparent and fair. In this respect, CIMULACT
provides an interestingmix of actors, but here, further research
is needed to i.e. evaluate power balance between groups.
Overall, processes such as CIMULACT may mitigate the
much stressed shortcoming of public engagement to not pro-
vide real impacts on policy making. A large actor basis, as
built in CIMULACT, supports creating ownership of results
among the actors themselves and building trust in them out-
side of the immediate participants. Yet, it is established that
impacts of policy advice in general, and the ones produced by
1 For the full text of all visions in English consult Deliverable 1.3 –Vision
Catalogue [98], for national languages consult the national reports on
citizens’ vision workshops [101].
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public engagement activities in particular, are hard to measure
[102], especially when considering a forward looking long
term perspective and an emphasis on system level [14].
Nevertheless that does not mean that impacts do not exist.
An evaluation of the projects’ methodology as well as an
impact assessment will be available by mid-2017. With regard
to CIMULACT, real interest by the European Commission
can be observed, proofed by first soliciting such a project
and secondly by actively being interested the projects’ prog-
ress and intermediate results. Yet, gate keepers power over the
flow of knowledge become once again obvious, as it needs
single interested and dedicated persons in the right positions
who actively seek integration of such socially robust co-
created knowledge to further sustainable and responsible in-
novation agendas.
Via this pathway, impact among economic actors may be
generated, although impacts may not have the aimed for high
degree of dispersion in the current still small scale experimen-
tal phase. Compared to the many public private partnerships
that have great lobbying power within the EU-research
funding scheme, research and policy advice such as conducted
under CIMULACT may become negligible. Yet, it shows,
how the political concept of RRI can be filled with meaning,
accountability and life, thereby serving as a landmark itself,
providing guidance for sustainable long term futures.
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
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Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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